Boundaries of volcanic eruptions and ash clouds impacting aviation. Current weather for 3, airports in the world overlayed on map.
Choose your location to get a site experience tailored for you. In addition, the industry weathered a major economic downturn and carried out a massive expansion of production capacity. Airplane original equipment manufacturers OEMsamong them Boeing and Airbus, are at the top of the industry value chain, yet they are consistently at the bottom of the pack when it comes to profitability.
The relative profitability of OEMs and suppliers excluding engine manufacturers has changed little from through This persistently steady allocation of profits raises the question: Factors Influencing Profit Allocation For decades, suppliers have reaped strong profits from the aftermarket, selling spare parts at margins well in excess of those generated by parts sold to OEMs for new aircraft.
Airplane OEMs, however, typically have not participated in the aftermarket to the same degree, in part because they rely on suppliers to build the majority of parts that require replacement.
Suppliers have enjoyed other advantages as well. Procurement dynamics, for example, favor suppliers because parts built Airbus bcg program specifications are expensive to develop and go through lengthy qualification processes, making it costly to switch parts or suppliers.
Because of this Airbus bcg supply base, airplane OEMs are less able to create competition among suppliers, especially in major subsystems.
Once the specs are set and production rates are high, competition becomes even less likely. The airplane OEMs, not the suppliers, typically shoulder most of the multibillion-dollar costs for the development of new aircraft designs and their derivatives.
Suppliers are also major drivers of performance and advancement in aircraft. Advances Airbus bcg avionics, materials science, and electric propulsion are driving next-generation aircraft capability and performance, and they all have strong supplier-driven components.
Finally, changes in supplier ownership have created more profitable businesses. Beginning in the early s, companies such as TransDigm and Precision Castparts PCC have developed a strategy of acquiring midsize suppliers and boosting profitability by aggressively raising prices, curbing development spending, and improving operating performance.
Similarly, Airbus has recently reopened competition on major A work packages even though its current risk-sharing partners are entering production. None of these tactics has significantly reduced the profit disparity between suppliers and airplane OEMs during the past decade, however, and they are unlikely to create a meaningful change in the future.
Quite simply, more stringent OEM procurement processes have not addressed the fundamental economics underlying commercial aircraft manufacturing.
More recently, some airplane OEMs have turned to selective insourcing, which gives them more potential for aftermarket profits for spare parts.
Boeing, for example, chose to bring in-house the manufacture of wings for the X and nacelles for the MAX. These are more profound moves than tactical procurement actions and could change the fundamental structure of the industry.
However, most airplane OEMs are limited in their ability to insource, and these programs will take years or even decades to generate an effect on profitability.
One way to lower costs is to create more competition among suppliers. Airplane OEMs can develop existing niche companies in the aerospace industry and encourage them to expand their product offerings, or they can bring in suppliers from other industries.
Both Boeing and Airbus have structured risk-sharing partnerships with suppliers on the development of new projects such as the and A XWB. These partnerships represent several billion dollars in at-risk funds for the suppliers, which have a greater stake in the successful rollout of the program.
By embedding the supplier in the development process, however, OEMs limit their ability to lower costs through the procurement process later on. Along with their focus on costs, Airbus and Boeing are increasing their involvement in the aftermarket.
Two Possible Outcomes Is the industry headed for a fundamental shift in the allocation of profits during the next decade?
In analyzing the profit landscape, we have identified two possible outcomes—one in which the pattern of the last decade and a half continues, and another in which OEMs reclaim a greater portion of profits from their supply base.
Suppliers maintain their superior profitability. In this scenario, the industry status quo holds and suppliers innovate both their products and their business models to maintain their advantage in the market. Airplane OEMs are able to make changes to the margin by insourcing and increasing leverage on key suppliers, but those changes result in only modest profit gains for OEMs, and supplier profitability is unaffected.
OEMs have limited—and expensive—options for vertically integrating through mergers and acquisitions because most suppliers serve both Boeing and Airbus, making large-scale integration more difficult. Meanwhile, more suppliers mimic the success of companies such as TransDigm and PCC by innovating their business models, and performance-enhancing advances for aircraft continue to be driven by systems and their suppliers rather than airframe design.
As a result, suppliers will be able to fend off airplane OEMs chasing a larger share of the aftermarket as well as niche competitors trying to expand their business.
OEMs change the industry structure and reverse supplier trends.
In this scenario, actions taken by OEMs during the past five years—insourcing, increased procurement leverage, dual-sourcing some parts, and cultivating niche suppliers—result in sustained increases in profitability for the decade ahead.
Airplane OEMs insource high-margin components such as cabin interiors and engines, undermining the model of companies such as TransDigm, which were designed for a time when airplane OEMs especially Boeing outsourced major portions of their aircraft. This model continues to erode as OEMs bring work in-house.
In addition, airplane OEMs are better able to leverage their intellectual property. In many cases, airplane OEMs have licensed production and distribution of spare parts to suppliers.
As those licenses expire, OEMs can raise prices for parts that are specified on existing aircraft, shifting aftermarket volumes and contract patterns and reducing supplier profits.At the same time, renewed fleets of next-generation aircraft, such as the Airbus Aneo and A and Boeing’s MAX, , and X, depress overall aftermarket demand as new lower-maintenance aircraft replace older higher-maintenance models.
privés Airbus sur une matrice BCG: Diagnostic externe: Marché de l’aviation militaire Depuis quelques années, Airbus intervient sur le marché de l’aviation militaire, par le biais de sa branche Airbus Military, et concurrence directement des entreprises telles que Boeing ou Lockheed.
Cependant, elle ne s’attaque pas à tous les secteurs de ce .
I am a Project Leader at BCG out of the Boston office, working mostly in industrials and technology-related projects, both in strategy and caninariojana.com: Project Leader at The Boston . All details for VQ-BCG (Rossiya - Russian Airlines Airbus A) - caninariojana.com The Boston Consulting Group October – August (2 years 11 months) Madrid, Spain Managed multiple international projects and teams across Europe and the US mainly in the oil & gas and industrial caninariojana.com: Partner and Managing Director at .
Airbus A with registration VQ-BCG (ex F-WWII, EC-HGY) airframe details and operator history including first flight and delivery dates, seat configurations, engines, fleet numbers and names.